

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 AID-20 ACDA-19 SAM-01

SAB-01 OMB-01 SAJ-01 IGA-02 DPW-01 DRC-01 /212 W

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R 271129Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5494

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 6185

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, UJ

SUBJ: NON-ALIGNED ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

REF: STATE 99106

SUMMARY: GOP TENDS TO FOLLOW LEAD OF NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE GROUP (NACG) IN ITS VOTING IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING DESIRE TO ACCOMMODATE CHINA, MAINTAIN ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY, AND IMPROVE ITS THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS. IN ISSUES WHERE US AND NACG ARE IN OPPOSITION, PAKS USUALLY VOTE WITH LATTER BUT REFRAIN FROM ACTIVE SUPPORT. NO SIGNS OF ANY LOOSENING OF PAK TIES WITH NACG COUNTRIES IN THIS REGARD NOR OF GOP DISILLUSIONMENT WITH NACG BLOC VOTING. DOUBTFUL THAT PAKS WOULD SUPPORT ANY INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE DIVERGENCE AMONG LDCS. SHOULD DIVERGENCES DEVELOP AS RESULT INITIATIVES BY OTHER MODERATE LDCS, HOWEVER, PAKS MIGHT WELL SIDE WITH MODERATES ON VARIOUS ISSUES AND EVEN ACT AS "BRIDGE" BETWEEN US AND LDCS. LITTLE PROSPECT USG CAN APPRECIABLY CHANGE GOP POSITION IN THIS AREA THROUGH BILATERAL APPROACHES IN ABSENCE CHANGE IN CERTAIN US POLICIES TOWARD PAKISTAN (ESPECIALLY ARMS SUPPLY) ALTHOUGH GREATER AND MORE
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TIMELY CONSULTATION WITH GOP ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES

MIGHT HELP. ATTEMPT
TO BRING PAKS AROUND BY THREAT TO
DIMINISH US ECONOMIC AID WOULD BE CONTRARY TO US
INTERESTS AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. AT LEAST SOME PAK
OFFICIALS FEEL US REGARDS VIEWS OF LDCS AS OF LITTLE
CONSEQUENCE AND THAT THIS MAKES SUPPORT FOR US POSITIONS
BY LDCS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. GREATER EFFORT ON OUR PART
TO ACCOMMODATE LDC VIEWS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. END SUMMARY.

1. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, GOP CUSTOMARILY TENDS TO FOLLOW
LEAD OF NACG IN ITS VOTING ON NUMBER OF ISSUES IN UNGA
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE IN
WHICH NACG ACTIVISTS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ENCOURAGE BLOC
VOTING BY LDCS. THIS HAS BROUGHT GOP ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS
INTO OPPOSITION WITH US.

2. GOP POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF TYPE USUALLY
SELECTED BY NACG ACTIVISTS FOR SPECIAL EFFORT TO COORDINATE
LDC VOTE IS NORMALLY DETERMINED BY PROACTICAL POLITICS
RATHER THAN ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES. PRIMARY GOP CONSIDERATIONS
INCLUDE (A) DESIRE TO ACCOMMODATE CHINA AND SUPPORT THOSE
ISSUES FAVORED BY CHINA. (B) DESIRE TO MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY
WITH MAJORITY OF MUSLIM COUNTRIES, AND (C) DESIRE TO
IMPROVE PAK CREDENTIALS AND EXTEND PAK INFLUENCE AMONG
NON-ALIGNED GROUP AS WHOLE. (ONE IMPORTANT BASIC MOTIVE
BEHIND THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS, OF COURSE, CHRONIC PAK
FEAR OF INDIA'S INTENTIONS AND DISPROPORTIONATE MILITARY
STRENGTH.) ON ISSUES SUCH AS RECOGNITION OF REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENTS, SOUTHERN AFRICA, ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, ETC.,
THESE THREE CONSIDERATIONS TEND TO REINFORCE EACH OTHER,
IN THAT CHINA, MOST MUSLIM STATES AND MAJORITY OF LDCS
ARE ALL ON SAME SIDE.

3. IN THOSE ISSUES WHERE POSITIONS OF US AND OF NACG
MEMBERS ARE IN OPPOSITION, PAKS USUALLY END UP TAKING
PASSIVE POSITION ON NACG SIDE, VOTING WITH NACG MAJORITY
BUT REFRAINING FROM LOBBYING OR SPEAKING OUT TOO STRONGLY
ON ISSUE. AS LONG AS NACG ACTIVISTS ARE ABLE TO RALLY
CHINA, MUSLIMS AND MOST OF LDCS INTO TAKING JOINT POSITION
ON THESE ISSUES, GOP WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO PART COMPANY
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WITH THEM. PAKS ARE VISIBLY UNCOMFORTABLE WHEN THIS BRINGS
THEM INTO CONFLICT WITH US, BUT MOST THEY HAVE BEEN PRE-
PARED TO DO IS TO SUBSTITUTE AN OCCASIONAL ABSTENTION FOR
A VOTE ON THE NACG MAJORITY SIDE.

4. WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION OF ANY LOSSENING OF PAK
TIES WITH MUSLIM NATIONS OR OTHER NACG COUNTRIES IN THIS
REGARD, NOR ARE THERE SIGNS PAKS MAY BE HAVING SECOND

THOUGHTS ABOUT HAZARDS OF NACG BLOC VOTING. TO THE CONTRARY, BHUTTO GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN GIVING VISIBLY GREATER EMPHASIS TO ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY AND THIRD WORLD TIES THAN ITS PREDECESSORS. THE GOP NOW ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH AND IMPROVE ITS THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS, WE DOUBT THAT PAKS WOULD CONSIDER SUPPORTING ANY INITIATIVE TO CHALLENGE UNITY OF LDCS OR ENCOURAGE DIVERGENCES AMONG THEM. FACT THAT PAKS, ALTHOUGH DROPPING OUT OF SEATO, HAVE RETAINED THEIR CENTO MEMBERSHIP, HAS MADE THEM EVEN MORE ANXIOUS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS TO SKEPTICAL NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES BY STRESSING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THIRD WORLD AND LDC SOLIDARITY. SHOULD DIVERGENCES AMONG NACG STATES DEVELOP AS RESULT INITIATIVES BY OTHER MODERATE LDCS, HOWEVER, PAKS WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO SIDE WITH MODERATES ON NUMBER OF ISSUES SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO CLEAR LDC CONSENSUS AGAINST THEM. PAKS HAVE, IN FACT, PRIVATELY INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACT AS "BRIDGE" BETWEEN US AND OTHER LDCS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

5. WE SEE LITTLE PROSPECT THAT WE CAN SHIFT GOP POSITION APPRECIABLY THROUGH BILATERAL APPROACHES IN ISSUES WHICH APPEAR TO BE DIRECT US OR WESTERN CHALLENGE TO THIRD WORLD UNITY, ALTHOUGH, AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE SOME PROGRESS IN ENCOURAGING MORE INDEPENDENT PRAGMATIC APPROACH WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON BILATERAL BASIS IF WE COULD FIND MEANS OF BREAKING UP MONOLITHIC NACG STANCE THROUGH OUR EFFORTS WITH OTHER LDCS. SPECIFIC MEASURES PROPOSED IN REFTEL PARAGRAPH 4(A), (B) AND (D) WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD, ESPECIALLY SUGGESTION FOR FULLER, MORE TIMELY CONSULTATION WITH GOP ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES.

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

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R 271129Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5495
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 6185

6. ALL TOO FREQUENT PATTERN IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN FOR EMBASSY TO RECEIVE PRIORITY INSTRUCTIONS FOR URGENT LAST-MINUTE APPROACH TO GOP SEEKING SUPPORT IN UNGA OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODY ON ISSUE IN WHICH GOP HAS ALREADY LONG SINCE DECIDED ITS POSITION. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT IN SOME CASES IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE PARTICULAR QUESTION ARISING UNTIL LAST MINUTE, OUR CHANCES OF OBTAINING PAK SUPPORT(OR AT LEAST ABSENCE OF OPPOSITION) WOULD BE SOMEWHAT IMPROVED IF WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS ISSUE WITH PAKS WELL IN ADVANCE OF UNGA ACTION, PREFERABLY AS PART OF BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS LIKELY TO COME UP DURING UNGA SESSION, TO BE HELD BEFORE SESSION COMMENCES.

7. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE RECALL THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN IN HABIT RECENTLY OF SENDING ONE OF THEIR UN EXPERTS FROM MOSCOW ON VISIT TO VARIOUS LDC CAPITALS(INCLUDING ISLAMABAD) IN ADVANCE OF UNGA SESSIONS, APPARENTLY FOR DISCUSSION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OF THOSE ISSUES USSR CONSIDERS MOST IMPORTANT AT FORTHCOMING SESSION.

8. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT REFTEL PARAGRAPH 4(C) PROPOSAL FOR AZADJUSTING OUR POSTURE TO ACCORD BENEFITS OR COSTS" TO LDCS WHO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE US IN THESE ISSUES COULD PRO-
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FITABLY BE EMPLOYED WITH PAKISTAN. IN PAKISTAN'S CASE, PRIMARY TOOL FOR AZADJUSTING OUR POSTURE" PRESUMABLY WOULD BE ECONOMIC AID FUNDS. US AID TO PAKISTAN IS PROVIDED BECAUSE WE HAVE DETERMINED IT IN US NATIONAL INTEREST THAT PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BE ASSISTED. TO DIMINISH IT OR CUT IT OFF IN ORDER TO PUNISH GOP FOR ADVERSE VOTE IN UNGA WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THAT INTEREST. MOREOVER, ANY THREAT TO DO SO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THAT GOP PRIDE AND SENSITIVITY WOULD SURELY IMPEL IT TO RESIST OUR PRESSURE.

9. IN THIS PROBLEM OF GROWING DIVERGENCE BETWEEN US AND NAGG IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, ONE COMMENT EXPRESSED INFORMALLY BY CERTAIN PAK OFFICIALS LAST YEAR MIGHT BE WORTH NOTING. IN COURSE OF SEVERAL PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS DURING PERIOD OF 28TH UNGA, TWO WORKING-LEVEL FOREIGN MISISTRY OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH UN AFFAIRS COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD GAINED IMPRESSION USG HAD COME TO REGARD VIEWS

OF LDCS AS OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE AND HAD DECIDED AGAINST ANY REAL EFFORT TO WORK WITH THEM. IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CONCERN THEY CITED SEVERAL UNGA VOTES IN WHICH OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF LDCS PLUS EASTERN EUROPEANS, SOVIETS, CHINESE, SCANDINAVIANS AND SOME WESTERN EUROPEANS WERE ON ONE SIDE, MOST MAJOR WESTERN POWERS ABSTAINED, AND US TOGETHER WITH PORTUGAL, SOUTH AFRICA AND A HANDFUL OF OTHERS WERE IN OPPOSITION. THIS ISOLATED US POSITION, PAKS SAID, SUGGESTED US LACK OF SYMPATHY FOR STRONGLY-HELD LDC ATTITUDES TOWARD SUCH EMOTIONAL ISSUES AS APARTHEID AND COLONIALISM, AND MADE IT JUST THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR EVEN GENERALLY PRO-US THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT US. TO EMBOFFS REPLY THAT US IN SUCH INSTANCES WAS VOTING NOT AGAINST LDCS BUT FOR CERTAIN PRINCIPLES, PAKS EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT US PRINCIPLES COULD REALLY DIFFER SO GREATLY NOT ONLY FROM THOSE OF MOST LDCS BUT FROM THOSE OF BULK OF US WESTERN FRIENDS AND ALLIES AS WELL.

10. IT STRUCK US AS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE THAT THESE REASONABLY SOPHISTICATED REPRESENTATIVES OF RELATIVELY FRIENDLY AND RESPONSIBLE LDC WERE INTERPRETING US VOTE ON THOSE ISSUES AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN DEVOTION TO PRINCIPLES. PAKS, IN OTHER WORDS, WERE JUDGING US ON CONFIDENTIAL

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BASIS ITS VOTE RATHER THAN ITS EXPLANATION OF REASONS FOR ITS VOTE. THEIR COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT IF PROBLEM OF US ISOLATION IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS IS AS SERIOUS AS REFTTEL INDICATES, IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE IN SOME CASES TO TRY TO ACCOMMODATE LDC VIEWS TO GREATER EXTENT IN ADVANCE OF FORMULATING OUR OWN FINAL POSITION. THIS WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE NOT ONLY OF ENHANCING PROSPECTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF POSITION FAVORABLE TO US BUT OF CREATING IMPRESSION, SO IMPORTANT TO GOP AS WELL AS TO TOTHER LDCS, THAT US CONSIDERS THEIR VIEWS IMPORTANT.

11. SUMMARIZING, WE HAVE NO MAJOR TACTICAL INNOVATIONS TO SUGGEST FOR IMPROVING ADMITTEDLY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION BETWEEN US AND NAGG COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES. IN BROAD PERSPECTIVE WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT ANY REALLY SIGNIFICANT LASTING IMPROVEMENT IS LIKELY WITHOUT CHANGES IN POLICIES(RATHER THAN TACTICS) ON BOTH SIDES, POSSIBLY INCLUDING SUCH MATTERS AS A REVERSAL OF LONG-TERM DOWNTREND IN PERCENTAGE OF US GNP DEVOTED TO ECONOMIC AID AND A LOWERING OF BARRIERS THAT REDUCE ACCESS TO US MARKETS FOR LDC MANUFACTURED GOODS. AS FAR AS PAKISTAN ITSELF IS CONCERNED, WE WOULD NOT EXPECT GOP TO CHANGE ITS POSITION ON ISSUES OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO ITSELF OR THOSE TO WHICH CHINA OR MUSLIM STATES ARE DEEPLY COMMITTED IN RESPONSE TO US APPROACHES UNLESS US ITSELF WERE PREPARED TO MAKE SUB-

STANTIAL CHANGES IN SUCH PRESENT POLICIES AS ARMS SUPPLY.
THERE MAY, HOWEVER, BE ISSUES IN WHICH THROUGH MORE ADEQUATE
AND TIMELY CONSULTATION GOP CAN BE MADE TO SEE ITS INTERESTS
AS MATCHING OURS(SUCH AS POWS AND MIAS) OR IN WHICH GOP
CONCURRENCE COULD BE OBTAINED THROUGH GREATER EFFORT ON
OUR PART TO ACCOMMODATE GOP VIEWS OR AT LEAST TO CREATE
APPEARANCE OF GREATER WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THEM SERIOUSLY.
THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY TRUE IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE
VARIOUS OTHER LDCS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN BREAKING OUT OF MOLD
OF UNANIMITY NAGG ACTIVISTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE.
BYROADE

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